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ABSTRACT 
 
Studies on human reasoning have long established that intuitions can bias inference and lead to 
violations of logical norms. Popular dual-process models, which characterize thinking as an 
interaction between intuitive (“System 1”) and deliberate (“System 2”) thought processes, have 
presented an appealing explanation for this observation. According to this account, logical 
reasoning is traditionally considered as a prototypical example of a task that requires effortful 
deliberate thinking. In recent years, however, a number of findings obtained with new 
experimental paradigms have questioned the traditional dual-process characterization. A key 
observation is that people can process logical principles in classic reasoning tasks intuitively and 
without deliberation. We review the paradigms and sketch how this work is leading to the 
development of revised dual-process models.  
 
Keywords: Dual-Process Theory; Reasoning; Decision-Making; Bias   
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INTRODUCTION: BIAS AND DUAL-PROCESS MODELS 1.0 
 
Sometimes a solution to a problem pops in to mind instantly and effortlessly whereas at other 
times arriving at a decision takes time and effort. This simple dichotomy between a more 
intuitive (“System 1”) and more deliberate (“System 2”) type of thinking lies at the heart of the 
dual-process theories that have been prominent in the reasoning and decision-making field 
since the 1970s. More recently, dual-process theory has gained a broader popularity, having 
been featured in best-selling books (e.g., Kahneman, 2011) and applied to a wide range of fields 
(Evans, 2008)—from moral philosophy (Greene, 2015) to prosocial cooperation (Rand, Greene, 
& Nowak, 2012).  
 The rise and development of dual-process theory in research on human thinking can be 
linked to an attempt to explain the phenomenon of “bias” in reasoning and decision-making 
research (Evans, 2016; Kahneman, 2011). Decades of research have shown that people readily 
violate the most elementary logical, mathematical, or probabilistic rules when a task cues an 
intuitive response that conflicts with these principles (see Table 1 for illustrations). Hence, 
reasoners often appear to be biased by their intuitions. The broad dual-process framework 
represents a simple and elegant explanation for the tendency for humans to be biased: Logical 
and probabilistic principles, unlike simple intuitive tasks like making stereotypical judgments or 
executing stimulus-response pairings, require demanding deliberate processing (e.g., Evans, 
2008; Stanovich & West, 2000). Because human reasoners have a strong tendency to minimize 
demanding computations, they will often refrain from engaging or completing the slow 
deliberate processing when mere intuitive processing has already cued a response (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). Consequently, most reasoners will simply stick to the 
intuitive response that quickly came to mind and fail to consider the logical implications. Hence, 
people will typically be biased because they do not detect that their intuitive hunch conflicts 
with logical considerations. The few reasoners who manage to give the logical response will be 
those who have sufficient motivation and resources to complete the deliberate computations 
and override the initially generated intuitive response (Stanovich & West, 2000). 
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INTUITIVE LOGIC  
 
The idea that logical reasoning requires deliberate processing fits nicely with the common belief 
that following logical or mathematical rules is hard (Kahneman, 2011). However, in the last 
decade numerous findings have questioned this key assumption and indicate that people have 
intuitive access to logical principles in classic reasoning tasks. That is, logic does not necessarily 
require System 2. Here we review the experimental paradigms that led to this discovery.  
 
Conflict Detection Paradigm 
 The conflict detection paradigm was developed to test whether reasoners who are 
“biased”—that is, they opt for an intuitively cued response instead of the logical response— 
detect that their answer violates logical considerations (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). Put 
differently, the question is whether biased reasoners show some sensitivity to their errors. To 
assess this, the conflict detection paradigm presents participants with standard “conflict” 
versions of classic reasoning problems and newly constructed “no-conflict” control versions (as 
illustrated in Table 1).  In the classic conflict versions, an intuitive association cues a response 
that conflicts with the logical response. In the no-conflict versions, this conflict is removed and 
both the intuitive association and logical considerations point to the same conclusion. Bias and 
conflict sensitivity are then reflected in differences in how people process both versions. If 
biased reasoners do not take logical principles into account, then conflict should be irrelevant 
and have no impact on reasoning.  
 Results indicate that biased reasoners often do show conflict sensitivity. For example, 
biased reasoners display increased response doubt–as reflected in lower confidence and longer 
decision latencies–when they give a biased answer on the conflict problems (De Neys, 2012). 
This conflict sensitivity is also observed under time-pressure and cognitive load (De Neys, 
2017a). Since deliberate processing is often assumed to be more time and cognitive resource 
demanding than intuitive processing, this finding implies that conflict detection occurs without 
the aid of System 2. Thus, the finding that biased reasoners show logical conflict sensitivity 
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when deliberate processing is experimentally sidelined suggests they are processing the logical 
principles intuitively. 
 
Two-Response Paradigm  
 The two-response paradigm was designed to explore the time-course of intuitive and 
deliberate processing (Thompson, Turner, & Pennycook, 2011).  In this paradigm, participants 
are asked to give two consecutive responses. First, they are asked to give their initial hunch and 
to respond as fast as possible with the first intuitive answer that comes to mind. Afterwards, 
they are allowed to take all the time they want to reflect on the problem and generate a final 
response. To make sure that the initial response is generated intuitively, it has to be generated 
under time-pressure and/or cognitive load (Bago & De Neys, 2017; Newman et al., 2017). This 
procedure again helps to minimize possible deliberation. The critical finding is that many 
reasoners who give a logic final response (i.e., after deliberation was allowed) already gave this 
response in the initial response stage in which they had to reason intuitively (Bago & De Neys, 
2017, 2019a). Hence, logical responders do not necessarily need to deliberate to override a 
faulty intuition; often their intuitive response is already logical. This further indicates that 
logical principles can be processed intuitively in common reasoning tasks.  
 
Instructional Set Paradigm  
 In traditional reasoning studies, participants are expected to reason in accordance with 
logical principles. Typically they are explicitly told to disregard their intuitive beliefs.  In the 
instructional set paradigm, these instructions are reversed (Handley, Newstead, & Trippas, 
2011). People are not asked to indicate which response is logically or probabilistically correct. 
Rather, they are asked to follow their intuition and indicate whether or not the conclusion is 
believable. The key observation is that people are slower to answer (and less confident) in 
those cases in which the intuitively cued belief-based response conflicts with logicality 
(Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2014; Trippas, Thompson, & Handley, 2017). These 
effects are present even if deliberation is minimized by forcing participants to respond as 
quickly as possible (Thompson, Trippas, Evans, & Pennycook, 2018). Hence, although people are 
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not instructed to reason logically, they spontaneously seem to do so and this interferes with 
their ability to make belief-based judgments.  
 
Logic-Liking Paradigm 
 In the logic-liking paradigm (Morsanyi & Handley, 2011) participants are presented with 
classic reasoning problems but are not asked to solve them. They are simply asked to make 
seemingly trivial judgments such as how much they ‘like’ the conclusion or even how bright 
they perceive it to be. The task and instructions explicitly avoid any reference to logic, 
reasoning or validity. People are told they will see a number of statements and will simply have 
to indicate how much they like them or how bright they look on the screen. Quite strikingly, 
results show that people implicitly discriminate valid and invalid conclusions in this task. 
Although people are not instructed to reason, they nevertheless indicate that they like valid 
conclusions more than invalid ones and judge them to be brighter (Trippas, Handley, Verde, & 
Morsanyi, 2017).  
 Why do people judge a valid conclusion as more likable or brighter when they are not 
even expected to reason? The explanation is built on a fluency misattribution account (Reber, 
Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998): Specifically, more fluently processed information is known to 
give rise to positive affect. If logical validity is processed intuitively, more fluently processed 
valid conclusions can be expected to give rise to positive feelings (Morsanyi & Handley, 2011). 
The idea is that this affective fluency signal is subsequently being interpreted as an increase in 
likability or brightness.  
 Irrespective of the specific fluency account, just like the instructional set findings, the 
liking paradigm indicates that people seem to spontaneously take logical validity into account. 
This further suggests that they can process elementary logical features intuitively without 
engaging in a deliberate reasoning process.   
 
TOWARDS A DUAL-PROCESS MODEL 2.0 
 
7 
 
The intuitive logic findings are hard to account for in the traditional dual-process model. 
Various scholars have therefore claimed it is time to move to a revised dual-process model 
(Ball, Thompson, & Stupple, 2017; Banks & Hope, 2014; De Neys, 2012; Handley et al., 2011; 
Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015; Reyna, Rahimi-Golkhandan, Garavito, & Helm, 2017; 
Thompson et al., 2018). One central aspect of this emerging perspective is that our conception 
of intuitive (“System 1”) processing needs to be upgraded (De Neys, 2017b).  Computations that 
were traditionally considered to require deliberate processing can also be cued intuitively. 
Under this view, multiple types of intuitive responses will be cued simultaneously (De Neys, 
2012; Pennycook et al., 2015). For example, when we’re faced with a classic reasoning problem 
one of these will be the traditional “heuristic” intuitive response that is based on prior beliefs 
and other associations. But a critical second response will be what we can refer to as a “logical” 
intuitive response which is based on elementary knowledge of basic logical and probabilistic 
principles.  
 Crucially, different intuitions can vary in their strength or activation level (Bago & De 
Neys, 2017; Pennycook et al., 2015; Thompson et al., 2018). In cases where multiple conflicting 
intuitive responses are cued, the strength difference will determine whether conflict is 
registered (the more similar the strength, the higher the likelihood of conflict detection) and 
whether deliberate processing will be called upon (Pennycook et al., 2015). This deliberate 
processing can then be used to override the dominant intuitive response or to simply 
rationalize it and look for an explicit justification that supports it (Pennycook et al., 2015).   
 Figure 1 sketches three illustrative cases. Obviously, the postulation of logical intuitions 
does not entail that people will always respond logically or that logical responding cannot be 
deliberate. Rather, the idea is that people have different types of intuitions—some of which are 
logical (accurate)—and that these intuitions can differ in strength. In some cases, the logical 
intuition will dominate the competing heuristic intuition (Figure 1B).  Here one can respond in 
accordance with logic without further deliberation. In other cases, the heuristic intuition will 
dominate (Figure 1A and 1C), and logical responding will therefore require deliberation. 
Crucially, the presence of a competing logical intuition allows people to detect conflict, which 
then can trigger the deliberative override of the heuristic intuition and result in a classic, “slow” 
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logical response. If the override fails, the reasoner will give the heuristic response. Any 
deliberate processing will be primarily used here to find an explicit justification for the 
dominant heuristic intuition (i.e., rationalization). Thus, even with successful conflict detection 
and resulting deliberation, people may still end up giving a “biased” answer. 
 Whether or not deliberate override will occur is tied to the likelihood of conflict 
detection. The more similar the strength of the competing intuitions (Figure 1C), the more 
conflict will be experienced, and the more likely that deliberation will occur. This, in turn, 
increases the likelihood that the dominant intuition will be overridden. Results from the two-
response and conflict detection paradigm indeed  indicate that participants who show a more 
pronounced conflict detection effect (e.g., as reflected in increased doubt about their initial 
response) are more likely to change their initial heuristic response after deliberation relative to 
those who are less responsive to conflict (Bago & De Neys, 2017; Thompson et al., 2011). 
Experimental manipulations that are aimed to increase or decrease the strength of logical 
intuitions (e.g., by making probabilities in base-rate neglect problems such as in Table 1 more or 
less extreme) further support this assumption (Bago & De Neys, 2019a; Pennycook et al., 2015).  
 A key implication of the logical intuition findings and dual-process evolutions is that we 
need to re-think the traditional view on the nature of biased and logical responding. Biased 
responding does not necessarily result from a failure to recognize conflict. Although reasoners 
might not always manage to override their heuristic intuition, they are not necessarily oblivious 
to its questionable status. At the other end of the spectrum, sound reasoning does not 
necessarily require a deliberation process. Although deliberate override of an initial dominant 
heuristic intuition sometimes occurs, the most prolific reasoners do not always need it. This 
implies that good reasoners do not necessarily deliberate better; often they will simply have 
better intuitions (Bago & De Neys, 2019b; Thompson et al., 2018).  
  
OUTSTANDING ISSUES  
 
Boundary conditions and individual differences  
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 The dual-process view “2.0” that is emerging is a work-in-progress. There remain 
important challenges. For example, the framework does not entail that we have logical 
intuitions for every possible problem we face in life. Rather, the claims concern the type of 
elementary principles that are evoked in classic reasoning problems (De Neys, 2012). The idea is 
that most adult reasoners managed to automatize these principles because they have been 
extensively exposed to them (e.g., in the school curriculum). Moreover, how complex these 
principles can be is an active open area of research (Trippas et al., 2016). Studies also point to 
individual differences: Although the modal biased reasoner might show conflict detection, a 
subgroup of individuals does not (Frey, Johnson, & De Neys, 2018; Pennycook et al., 2015). It is 
possible that this group has not managed to automatize the application of the necessary logical 
knowledge (Stanovich, 2018). Pinpointing the exact boundary conditions and individual 
differences remains an important challenge in the coming years.   
 
Origin logical intuition 
 The concept of a logical intuition does not imply that it is inborn or instinctive. Although 
infants might show some early logical sensitivity (Cesana-Arlotti et al., 2018), it is assumed that 
people’s intuitive logical knowledge emerges from a learning process in which key principles 
have been practiced to automaticity (De Neys, 2012). The basic mechanism of a deliberate-to-
intuitive automatization process (e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) has long been recognized in 
traditional dual-process models. For example, it is long been assumed that experts in various 
fields are characterized by the automatization of previously deliberate procedures (Kahneman, 
2011). Hence, the underlying automatization process that is assumed to give rise to logical 
intuitions is not new. The key insight is that it applies to a much wider range of phenomena—
including mastery of basic logical principles by laypeople—than previously believed. 
Nevertheless, the logical automatization assumption remains to be tested directly.     
 
Role of deliberation? 
 The case for fast logical intuitions might seem to downplay the role of “System 2” 
deliberation in dual-process theory. If we can generate logical responses intuitively, why do we 
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even need to engage in effortful deliberation? The answer brings us back to the idea that 
different types of intuitions will be cued simultaneously. The generation of a logical intuition 
does not imply that it will dominate. Logical responding to the task will still require a deliberate 
override when the competing heuristic intuition is stronger. Furthermore, even when people 
have dominant logical intuitions, the fact that deliberation is not needed to override does not 
imply it cannot serve a different function. For example, Bago and De Neys (2019b) observed 
that after deliberation (in a two-response study) people had little trouble properly justifying 
their logical responses. Such correct justifications were much less likely for logical responses in 
the initial response stage. Hence, just like reasoners may use deliberation to look for a 
justification to support a heuristic intuition, they may need it to come up with a proper, explicit 
justification for their intuitive logical insight. In theory, such a process can play an important 
role in communication (e.g., Mercier & Sperber, 2017), but its precise nature remains to be 
clarified.  
  
Generalization 
 We noted that the core ideas that were put forward by the original dual-process model 
have been applied in various fields. This led to dual-process models of, for example, prosocial 
cooperation (Rand et al., 2012) and moral reasoning (Greene, 2015) that became highly 
influential in their own right. The research reviewed here indicates that there are good reasons 
to question core assumptions of the traditional dual-process architecture that inspired these 
models. In theory, the various paradigms we introduced can be used to test dual-process 
assumptions beyond logical reasoning tasks. Interestingly, initial findings with the conflict 
detection and two-response paradigm point to a remarkable similarity between logical and 
moral reasoning: The moral response that is traditionally believed to result from deliberate 
processing (i.e., calculating the greater good) often is cued intuitively (e.g., Bago & De Neys, 
2019c; Bialek & De Neys, 2017). Although this lends some credence to the generality of the 
findings it will be critical to test the applicability of the new architecture in various contexts. 
 
CONCLUSION 
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Research with new experimental paradigms indicates that logical processing can be done 
intuitively. We sketched how this is leading to a revision of popular dual-process model 
assumptions. Although the traditional dual-process model has been highly instrumental, we 
believe it is time to move to a new conceptualization. We hope that the many students and 
scholars who are interested in the dual-process perspective will take note of the new 
developments and integrate them in their work. 
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Table 1. Illustration of classic reasoning problems. Both standard (a.) and control (b.) versions 
are shown. The standard versions cue an intuitive response that conflicts with the logical 
response (i.e., the response consistent with standard logic or probability theory principles, 
highlighted in bold). In the control versions the cued intuitive response is consistent with the 
logical response.  
Syllogistic reasoning problem: 
 
a. Standard “Conflict” version 
Premises:  All flowers need water 
   Roses need water 
Conclusion: Roses are flowers 
  
1. The conclusions follows logically  
2. The conclusion does not follow logically 
 
 
 
 
b. Control “No Conflict” version 
Premises:  All flowers need water 
   Roses are flowers 
Conclusion: Roses need water 
  
1. The conclusions follows logically  
2. The conclusion does not follow logically 
 
Rationale: The conclusion in the standard version is not logically valid. However, because the conclusion is believable (i.e., it 
fits with our prior beliefs) many people will nevertheless accept it. In the control version the conclusion is both believable 
and logically valid. Here our prior beliefs and logic do not conflict.  
 
 
Base-rate neglect problem: 
 
a. Standard “Conflict” version 
A psychologist wrote thumbnail descriptions of a sample 
of 1000 participants consisting of 995 people whose 
favorite drink is wine and 5 people whose favorite drink is 
beer. The description below was chosen at random from 
the 1000 available descriptions.  
 
Ryan is 27 and lives in Virginia. He drives to work in his 
truck and likes to wear shirts of his favorite NFL team. He 
loves hanging out with his buddies. 
 
 Which one of the following two statements is most 
likely? 
1. Ryan’s favorite drink is wine  
2. Ryan’s favorite drink is beer 
 
 
 
b. Control “No Conflict” version 
A psychologist wrote thumbnail descriptions of a sample 
of 1000 participants consisting of 995 people whose 
favorite drink is beer and 5 people whose favorite drink is 
wine. The description below was chosen at random from 
the 1000 available descriptions.  
 
Ryan is 27 and lives in Virginia. He drives to work in his 
truck and likes to wear shirts of his favorite NFL team. He 
loves hanging out with his buddies.  
 
Which one of the following two statements is most likely? 
1. Ryan’s favorite drink is wine  
2. Ryan’s favorite drink is beer 
 
Rationale: In the standard version intuitive beliefs based on the stereotypical description (“a truck driving southern NFL fan 
typically drinks beer”) conflict with the response that is favoured by the base-rate probabilities (i.e., there are far more wine 
drinkers in the sample). In the control version the base-rates are switched around so that both the base-rates and 
description cue the same response.  
 
 
Bat-and-ball problem: 
 
a. Standard “Conflict” version 
A bat and a ball together cost $1.10.  
The bat costs $1 more than the ball.  
How much does the ball cost? ___ (5 cents) 
 
 
 
b. Control “No Conflict” version 
A bat and a ball together cost $1.10.  
The bat costs $1.  
How much does the ball cost? ___ (10 cents) 
 
Rationale: Most people readily answer “10 cents” instead of the correct “5 cents” to the standard problem because they 
intuitively parse the $1.10 in $1 and 10 cents. In the control version this intuitive parsing is also mathematically correct.  
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Figure 1. A key feature of the dual process model 2.0 view is that different types of intuitions 
will be generated that can differ in activation strength. Three prototypical cases are illustrated. 
The modal case (A) is the one in which the heuristic intuition dominates. In cases the logical 
intuition dominates (B) the logical response will be generated without further deliberation. The 
more similar the activation strength (C), the more likely that the dominant intuition will be 
overridden via deliberation.    
